Abstract Enabling accurate analysis of social network data while preserving differential privacy has been challenging since graph features such as clustering coefficient or modularity often have high sensitivity, which is different from traditional aggregate functions (e.g., count and sum) on tabular data. In this paper, we treat a graph statistics as a function f and develop a divide and conquer approach to enforce differential privacy. The basic procedure of this approach is to first decompose the target computation f into several less complex unit computations f 1 ; . . .; f m connected by basic mathematical operations (e.g., addition, subtraction, multiplication, division), then perturb the output of each f i with Laplace noise derived from its own sensitivity value and the distributed privacy threshold i ; and finally combine those perturbed f i as the perturbed output of computation f. We examine how various operations affect the accuracy of complex computations. When unit computations have large global sensitivity values, we enforce the differential privacy by calibrating noise based on the smooth sensitivity, rather than the global sensitivity. By doing this, we achieve the strict differential privacy guarantee with smaller magnitude noise. We illustrate our approach using clustering coefficient, which is a popular statistics used in social network analysis. Empirical evaluations on five real social networks and various synthetic graphs generated from three random graph models show that the developed divide and conquer approach outperforms the direct approach.
Introduction
The privacy preserving data mining community has expended great effort in developing sanitization techniques to effectively anonymize data so that the sanitized data can be published or shared with others. Researchers have proposed various privacy models such as k-anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney 1998), l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al. 2006) , and t-closeness (Li et al. 2007 ) and developed various sanitization approaches including suppression, generalization, randomization, permutation, and synthetic data generation. Refer to a recent survey book (Aggarwal and Yu 2008) for details. The aim is that an honest analyst should be able to perform a variety of ad hoc analysis and derive accurate results, whereas a malicious attacker should be unable to exploit the published data to infer private information about individuals. All these sanitization approaches adopt the idea of pre-processing the raw data such that each individual's record or her sensitive attribute values are hidden within a group of other individuals. However, there is no guarantee to achieve strict privacy protection since they could not completely prevent adversaries from exploiting various auxiliary information-e.g., via background knowledge attacks (Du et al. 2008; Martin et al. 2007 ) and composition attacks (Ganta et al. 2008 )-to breach privacy.
Differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006b; Dwork 2011 ) is a paradigm of post-processing the output of queries such that the inclusion or exclusion of a single individual from the data set makes no statistical difference to the results found. Differential privacy provides formal privacy guarantees that do not depend on an adversary's background knowledge (including access to other databases) or computational power. Differential privacy is achieved by introducing randomness into query answers. Most differential privacy research focused on theoretical studies on enforcing differential privacy in relational databases (Barak et al. 2007; Blum et al. 2005 Blum et al. , 2008 Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2008; Dwork et al. 2006a, b; Dwork and Smith 2010; Friedman and Schuster 2010; Ganta et al. 2008; Ghosh et al. 2009; Hay et al. 2010; Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2011; Lee and Clifton 2012; Li et al. 2010; Sarathy and Muralidhar 2009; Xiao et al. 2011; Ying et al. 2013) . The applicability of enforcing differential privacy in real world applications has also been studied, e.g., the application of differential privacy to collaborative recommendation system (McSherry and Mironov 2009), logistic regression (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2008) , publishing contingency tables (Barak et al. 2007; Xiao et al. 2010) or data cubes (Ding et al. 2011) , privacy preserving integrated queries (McSherry 2009), computing graph properties such as degree distributions ) and clustering coefficient (Rastogi et al. 2009) , and spectral analysis in social network analysis.
Differential privacy is usually achieved by directly adding calibrated Laplace noise on the output of the computation f. The calibrating process of this approach (denoted as direct) includes the calculation of the global sensitivity of the computation f that bounds the possible change in the computation output over any two neighboring databases. The added noise is generated from a Laplace distribution with the scale parameter determined by the global sensitivity of f and the user-specified privacy threshold : This approach works well for traditional aggregate functions (often with low sensitivity values) over tabular data.
In social network analysis, various graph features such as cluster coefficient and modularity often have a high sensitivity (proportional to the number of nodes), which is different from traditional aggregate functions (e.g., count and sum) on tabular data. Furthermore, for some computations such as spectral decomposition, we may not have explicit formula to calculate global sensitivity. A divide and conquer approach has been suggested in the literature (Dwork et al. 2006b ). The basic procedure of this approach (denoted as D&C) is to first decompose the target computation f into several less complex unit computations f 1 ; . . .; f m connected by basic mathematical operations (e.g., addition, subtraction, multiplication, division), then perturb the output of each f i with Laplace noise derived from its own sensitivity value and the distributed privacy threshold i ; and finally combine those perturbed f i as the perturbed output of computation f. However, this straightforward adaptation could lead to poor performance especially when multiplication or division operations are involved. Furthermore, there is no theoretical study on calculating the unbiased estimate of f from perturbed results of f i s. In this paper, we theoretically examine how various operations affect the accuracy of complex computations. When unit computations have large global sensitivity values, we enforce the differential privacy by calibrating noise based on the smooth sensitivity (Nissim et al. 2007) , rather than the global sensitivity. By doing this, we achieve the strict differential privacy guarantee with smaller magnitude noise. We illustrate our approach by learning clustering coefficient (a popular graph feature used in social network analysis) from private networks. Empirical evaluations on five real social networks and various synthetic graphs generated from three random graph models show that the developed divide and conquer approach outperforms the direct approach.
Background
We first revisit the formal definition of differential privacy and the classic mechanism of enforcing differential privacy by calibrating Laplace noise based on global sensitivity in Sect. 2.1. We then introduce the smooth sensitivity framework (Nissim et al. 2007 ) when global sensitivity yields unacceptable high noise levels in Sect. 2.2. The smooth sensitivity framework can calibrate the instancespecific noise with smaller magnitude than the worst-case noise based on the global sensitivity. In Sect.2.3, we introduce complex graph models by which we generate various synthetic graphs for our empirical evaluation in Sect. 5.
Differential privacy
In prior work on differential privacy, a database is treated as a collection of rows, with each row corresponding to the data of a different individual. Here we focus on how to compute graph features from private network topology described as its adjacency matrix. We aim to ensure that the inclusion or exclusion of a link between two individuals from the graph makes no statistical difference to the results found.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy Dwork 2011) A graph analyzing algorithm W that takes as input a graph G, and outputs WðGÞ; preserves ðe; dÞ-differential edge privacy if for all closed subsets S of the output space, and all pairs of neighboring graphs G and G 0 from CðGÞ;
where CðGÞ ¼ fG 0 ðV; E 0 Þj9!ðu; vÞ 2 G but ðu; vÞ 6 2 G 0 g:
A differentially private algorithm provides an assurance that the probability of a particular output is almost the same whether or not any individual edge is included. The privacy parameter pair ð; dÞ controls the amount by which the distributions induced by two neighboring graphs may differ (smaller values enforce a stronger privacy guarantee).
A general method for computing an approximation to any function f while preserving -differential privacy is given by Dwork et al. (2006b) . The mechanism for achieving differential privacy computes the sum of the true answer and random noise generated from a Laplace distribution. The magnitude of the noise distribution is determined by the sensitivity of the computation and the privacy parameter specified by the data owner. The sensitivity of a computation bounds the possible change in the computation output over any two neighboring graphs (differing at most one link).
Definition 2 (Global sensitivity- Dwork et al. 2006b) The global sensitivity of a function f :
, in the analysis of a graph G, is 
Theorem 1 (The mechanism of adding Laplace noise- Dwork et al. 2006b ) An algorithm A takes as input a graph G, and some [ 0; a query Q with computing function f : D n ! R d ; and outputs
where the Y i is drawn i.i.d from LapðGS f ðGÞ=Þ: The algorithm satisfies ð; 0Þ-differential privacy.
Differential privacy maintains composability, i.e., differential privacy guarantees can be provided even when multiple differentially private releases are available to an adversary.
Theorem 2 (Composition theorem-Dwork and Lei 2009) If we have n numbers of ð; dÞ-differentially private mechanisms M 1 ; . . .; M n ; computed using graph G, then any composition of these mechanisms that yields a new mechanism M is ðn; ndÞ-differentially private.
Differential privacy can extend to group privacy as well: changing a group of k edges in the data set induces a change of at most a multiplicative e k in the corresponding output distribution. In this paper, we focus on the edge privacy. We can extend the algorithm to achieve the node privacy using the above composition theorem (Dwork and Lei 2009 ).
Smooth sensitivity
It may be hard to derive the global sensitivity of a complex function or global sensitivity yields unacceptable high noise levels. Nissim et al. (2007) introduces a framework that calibrates the instance-specific noise with smaller magnitude than the worst-case noise based on the global sensitivity.
Definition 3 (Local sensitivity- Dwork et al. 2006b; Nissim et al. 2007) The local sensitivity of a function
Under the definition of local sensitivity, we only consider the set of G 0 for a given and predetermined G, such that the inclusion or exclusion of a single link between individuals cannot change the output distribution appreciably. We would emphasize that the release f(G) with noise proportional to LS f (G) cannot achieve rigorous differential privacy as the noise magnitude might reveal information about the database. Refer to Example 1 in Nissim et al. (2007) for an illustrative example. To satisfy the strict differential privacy, Nissim et al. (2007) propose the b-smooth sensitivity and show that adding noise proportional to a smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity yields a private output perturbation mechanism.
Definition 4 (Smooth sensitivity- Nissim et al. 2007 
where d(G, G 0 ) is the distance between graphs G and G 0 . Nissim et al. (2007) introduces how to compute smooth sensitivity based on the local sensitivity at distance s (measuring how much the sensitivity can change when up to s entries of G are modified). Theorem 3 shows the mechanism of calibrating noise to the smooth bound to achieve ð; dÞ-differential privacy. 
Graph generation models
Several network models have been proposed for studying the topological properties of real networks. Among them, the Erdös and Rényi random graphs, the Watts and Strogatz small-world model, and the Barabási-Albert scale-free networks have been widely used (Costa et al. 2007 ). In our work, we use the above three models with various parameters to generate synthetic graphs for empirical evaluation.
The Erdös and Rényi random graph (ERDdS and R & WI 1959) is the most basic model of complex networks which defines a graph with n vertices and a probability p of connecting each pair of vertices. In this model, the average degree of each node is p(n -1) and the degree distribution is a Poisson distribution. The global cluster coefficient of the graph equals p. We refer to this model as the ER model in our paper.
The small-world model of Watts and Strogatz (Watts and Strogatz 1998) is the most popular model of random networks with the small-world property, i.e., most vertices can be reached from others through a small number of edges. The Watts and Strogatz model can also generate graphs in the presence of a large number of triangles. In contrast, ER networks have the small-world property but a small average clustering coefficient. We can construct a small-world network by staring with a regular lattice of n nodes in which each node is connected to k nearest neighbors in each direction. Next each edge is randomly rewired with probability p. When p nears zero, the generated graph tends to have a high number of triangles but large distances; when p gets close to 1, the generated graph becomes a random graph with short distances but few triangles. The degree distribution for small-world networks is similar to that of random networks, with average degree 2k. The cluster coefficient of the graph is correlated to 3ðkÀ1Þ 2ð2kÀ1Þ ð1 À pÞ 3 (Costa et al. 2007 ). Scale-free small-world networks have received much attention recently. For example, Caci et al. (2012) presented an algorithm to generate graphs with small-world properties by replacing each node of a random graph with cliques of different sizes. Sallaberry et al. (2013) developed a model for generating social networks having community structures with small-world and scale-free properties. In Zaidi (2013), small-world properties were examined in a snapshot of the facebook social network. We refer to the small-world model of Watts and Strogatz as the WS model in our paper.
The scale-free networks of Barabási and Albert (Barabási and Albert 1999) were proposed after the WS model to capture the characteristics of some networks whose degree distributions follow a power law. In scalefree networks, some vertices are highly connected while others have few connections. The Barab asi and Albert model generates a graph by starting with a set of m 0 nodes; afterwards, at each step of the construction, the network grows with the addition of new nodes. For each new node, m 1 new edges are added between the new node and some previous nodes. The nodes which receive the new edges are picked following a linear preferential attachment rule so that the most connected nodes have greater probability to receive new nodes as neighbors. The degree distribution of graphs generated by this model is P(d)* d -3 . The average degree is 2m 1 . The cluster coefficient of the graph is correlated to n -0.75
. We refer to this model as the BA model in our paper.
A divide and conquer algorithm
Our divide and conquer approach is to express a function f in terms of unit computations f 1 ; . . .; f m such that f can be calculated from results of f i (i ¼ 1; . . .; m) via basic mathematical operations : In this paper, we limit as linear combination, multiplication, and division. In our future work, we will extend our study to other mathematical operations such as root square and logarithm which are often used in data mining algorithms. For each unit computation f i , we introduce noise so as to maintain its differential privacy requirement ð i ; d i Þ: Specifically, we can run the randomization mechanism with noise distribution on each f i to achieve ð i ; d i Þ-differential privacy. Using Theorem 2, we can achieve ð; dÞ-differential privacy of f where
Algorithm 1 illustrates our divide and conquer approach. In Line 2, the total privacy budget ð; dÞ is distributed among unit computations such that each f i has a privacy threshold ð i ; d i Þ: It is a challenging problem to determine the optimal distribution of privacy budget such that the combined outputf achieves the optimal approximation of f. In our paper, we simply distribute privacy budget equally among all unit computations, i.e.,
In our evaluation, we show that the accuracy of the outputf varies significantly when we have different privacy budget distributions among f i . In Lines 3-12, we enforce ð i ; d i Þ-differential privacy on each f i . For f i that has small global sensitivity GS f i ðGÞ; we apply Theorem 1 directly (Line 10). For f i that may still have large global sensitivity or may not have an explicit formula for deriving global sensitivity, we first calculate its local sensitivity at distance s (Line 5), derive the smooth sensitivity parameter (b, a) based on the ð i ; d i Þ (Line 6), compute its b-smooth sensitivity (Line 7), and finally enforce ð i ; d i Þ-differential privacy on f i by following Theorem 3 to calibrate noise based on the derived smooth sensitivity (Line 8). In Line 13, we output ð; dÞ-differential privatef by integratingf i (i ¼ 1; . . .; m).
Next we show that our divide and conquer approach achieves unbiased estimate of f when operations contain linear combination, multiplication, and division. For simplicity, we choose one pair of functions, f i and f j . We assume the true value of f i (f j ) on a given data set is a (b) and f i (f j ) is perturbed by a Laplace noise Lap(0,a 0 )
0 Þ: Lemma 1 shows that the linear combination of Laplace noise perturbed results (f i andf j ) is an unbiased estimate for the linear combination of the original variables (f i and f j ). This lemma covers the mathematical operations of addition and subtraction. Similarly, Lemmas 2 and 3 show the result for multiplication and division, respectively. We leave all proof details in Appendix.
Lemma 1 The linear combination of two perturbed values with Laplace noise is an unbiased estimate for the linear combination of the two original values without the perturbations.
Assuming that a; b; a 0 ; b 0 2 R; and u; v 2 R are parameters of the linear combination.
Lemma 2 The product of two perturbed values with independent Laplace noise is an unbiased estimate for the product of the two original values without the perturbations.
Assuming that a; b; a 0 ; b 0 2 R and a, b are independently perturbed.
Lemma 3 The quotient of two perturbed results with Laplace noise is an unbiased estimate for the quotient of the two original values without the perturbation.
Assuming that a; b; a 0 ; b 0 2 R and b = 0.
On learning cluster coefficient 929
Learning vertex clustering coefficient
In this section, we illustrate our D&C-based differential privacy preserving approach by learning vertex clustering coefficient, a widely used graph metric in social network analysis. Specifically, we show how to derive the local sensitivity at distance s (a key step in Algorithm 1, Line 5) for vertex clustering coefficient. We would emphasize here that our approach works naturally with other graph metrics such as graph modularity and data mining tasks (where functions can be decomposed by unit computations connected by basic mathematical operations).
The vertex clustering coefficient of vertex i in a graph quantifies how close i's neighbors are to being a clique (complete graph). This measure was first introduced by Watts and Strogatz (1998) to determine whether a graph is a small-world graph.
where N D ðiÞ is the number of triangles involving vertex i, N 3 (i) is the number of connected triples having i as the central vertex, and d i is the degree of vertex i. We can see that C i can be naturally expressed as a quotient of two unit computations N D ðiÞ and N 3 (i) or a quotient of N D ðiÞ and d i (d i -1)/2. In social network analysis, data miners often query for the vector C ¼ ðC 1 ; . . .; C n Þ 0 ; which contains the clustering coefficients of all the vertices. For example, the average vertex clustering coefficient among all the vertices, which is defined as e C ¼ 1 n P i C i ; is a widely used metric for graph analysis. We can see that C can also be expressed by two vectors, N D ¼ ðN D ð1Þ; . . .; N D ðnÞÞ 0 and Table 1 shows the notations used in our paper. Table 2 shows the global sensitivity and local sensitivity for the vertex clustering coefficient C i (as well as its decomposed unit computations N D ðiÞ; N 3 ðiÞ; d i ) and all vertices's clustering coefficients C (as well as its decomposed unit computations N D ; N 3 ; D). We skip the proof details in this paper since most of them are either well known or can be easily derived. We would point out that degree sequence D has a low global sensitivity while other functions such as N D have very high global sensitivity value.
To apply our D&C algorithm, we need to derive the formulas of the local sensitivity at distance s for all above computations. We show our derived results in the remainder of this section and leave all proof details in Appendix. Result 1 shows the formula of the local sensitivity at distance s for the vertex clustering coefficient C i and Result 2 shows the formulas of the local sensitivity at distance s for N D ðiÞ and N 3 (i). Result 3 shows the formula of the local sensitivity at distance s for the clustering coefficient vector C, and Result Table 2 Global sensitivity and local sensitivity of graph metrics
4 shows the formulas of the local sensitivity at distance s for vector N D and N 3 .
Result 3 The local sensitivity at distance s for C ¼ ðC 1 ; . . .; C n Þ 0 is The local sensitivity of N 3 at distance s is
where b ij ¼ P k2½n a ik È a kj is the number of half-built triangles involving edge (i, j). Lemma 4 The unbiased estimate for the product of the linear combinations of the same perturbed value with Laplace noise is
Assuming that a 2 R andã ¼ a þ Lapð0; a 0 Þ:
The time complexity for computing the cluster coefficient C i for node i is O(d i 2 ), where d i denotes the degree of node i. In the worst case where the node degree may be as large as n -1, the time complexity is O(n 2 ) for computing the cluster coefficient of one node and O(n 3 ) for computing the cluster coefficients of all vertices. Since the time complexity of perturbing one output with the Laplacian noise is O(1), enforcing differential privacy by the direct approach has no influence on the time complexity of the original algorithm of computing cluster coefficient. Furthermore, our divide and conquer approach, which decomposes the computation f into m less complex unit computations f 1 ; . . .; f m connected by basic mathematical operations, has the same time complexity as the direct approach because m is often a small constant. Note that it takes constant time for the algorithm to compute b-smooth sensitivity S Ã f i ;b ðGÞ (Line 7 in Algorithm 1). This is because we can compute the maximum value by calculating the derivative on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) rather than iteratively calculating the value for each distance s. In the characteristics of the function e -sb LS f s (G), the e -sb part decreases exponentially as s increases while the LS f s (G) part increases polynomially, which ensures the strategy of computing the derivative feasible.
Empirical evaluation
In this section, we conduct evaluations to compare the utility of the direct approach and the D&C D approach on five real graphs and several synthetic graphs generated with three graph models, ER model, WS model and BA model (refer to Sect.2.3).
The five real graphs are denoted respectively as GrQc, Enron, Polbooks, Polblogs, and YesIWell. GrQc is the General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology collaboration network from the SNAP Stanford (Leskovec 2013) . Table 3 gives some published statistics of the GrQc dataset. We mainly use the GrQc graph data for comparing the utility preservations of different approaches in Sect. 5.1 and exploring the privacy budget distribution in Sect. 5.2. Enron 1 is an email network collected and prepared by the CALO Project and it has 148 nodes and 869 edges; Polbooks 2 is a network of books about US politics published around the time of the 2004 presidential election and sold by Amazon.com and it has 105 nodes and 441 edges; Polblog (Adamic and Glance 2005 ) is a network of hyperlinks between weblogs on US politics; YesIWell is a human physical activities-related social network dataset with 185 nodes and 684 edges, which is part of the data gained from the YesIWell study 3 conducted in 2010-2011 as collaboration among several health laboratories and universities to help people maintain active lifestyles and lose weight.
Synthetic graphs are generated using the software Gephi 4 with the Complex Generators plugin. For each graph model (ER, WS, and BA), we generate several graphs by varying graph generation parameters. Table 4 shows some basic characteristics of the generated graphs, where n denotes the number of nodes, m denotes the number of edges, " c is the average cluster coefficient, n D is the total number of triangles in the graph, fr D is the fraction of the closed triangles, which is defined as the total number of triangles divided by the total number of length of two paths. The generation parameters for the ER model are denoted as (n, p), those for the WS model as (n, k, p) and those for the BA model as (n, m 0 , m 1 ) (refer to Sect. 2.3). For all synthetic graphs, we fix the number of nodes as 1,000.
Utility
We compare our divide and conquer approach with the direct approach that directly adds calibrated Laplace noise on the output of the computation of f. For vertex cluster coefficient C i , to examine how different decomposition strategies affect the accuracy of the final outputCðiÞ; we include evaluation results on two decomposition strategies: (N D ðiÞ; N 3 ðiÞ) and (N D ðiÞ; d i ). Table 5 shows comparisons of these three methods, denoted as direct, D&C N 3 ðiÞ , and D&C d i ; respectively. In our experiments, we fix d = 0.01 and vary 2 f0:01; 0:1; 1; 10g: We choose the node with the largest degree (d i = 81) for the vertex cluster coefficient. For each of three methods with every privacy setting, we repeat the randomization process for 3,000 times. We report the the mean and standard deviation of the absolute error betweeñ C i and C i in Table 5 . Similarly for clustering coefficient vector C, we use D&C N 3 and D&C D to denote divide and conquer approaches based on two decomposition strategies. We set 0 here with the magnitude of n Á ; where 2 f0:01; 0:1; 1; 10g: As a result, each entry of the vector achieves the same ð; dÞ-differential privacy as the previous experiment. Table 6 shows our comparisons.
Note that in our experiments, we also use the bsmooth sensitivity in the direct approach. This is because the utility is significantly lost if we use the global sensitivity. For example, if we use the global sensitivity for C i when ¼ 1; the error is 0.3558 ± 0.1915, which is significantly larger than 0.0338 ± 0.0332 (shown in Table 5 ) of the direct approach using the smooth sensitivity.
We have following observations from our evaluation results. First, in general, the D&C approach achieves equivalent utility as, if not better than, that of the direct approach. This result indicates that we can still enforce differential privacy by decomposing a complex function into unit computations even though the complex function may have a large global sensitivity or may not have an explicit formula of its global sensitivity. Second, for the D&C approach, querying for the degree sequence D instead of the N 3 vector will probably lead to better utility. This is because the degree sequence has a low global sensitivity. Third, under the same privacy threshold, it is much better to query for the vector of all the clustering coefficients at once rather than to query for the vertex clustering coefficient one by one.
Distribute privacy budget
Note that in our previous experiments, we adopted a simple strategy, i.e., distributing privacy budget equally among unit computations. One conjecture is that the D&C approach would achieve much better utility preservation if we have a better strategy of distributing privacy budget. For example, in our D&C D method that obtains the clustering coefficient vector C by querying for the vectors N D and D, the sensitivity magnitude of the vector N D is much larger than that of the vector D. Hence we expect to achieve better utility if we distribute more privacy budget to N D than to D. On the other hand, one characteristic of the division is that the denominator is more sensitive than the numerator, having more influence on the quotient result. As a result, the denominator vector D may need more privacy budget under certain conditions. Figure 1 shows how preservation of utility (in terms of approximation error shown as X axis) varies when we change the ratio of the privacy budget on N D (numerator) and the privacy budget on D (shown as Y axis) when we apply our D&C D method with the total budget ¼ 0:1; 1:0; 10: The red lines correspond to the direct method and the blue curves correspond to the D&C D method. The points of those blue curves that are under the red line show the privacy budget distributions with which the D&C D method outperforms the direct method. Our evaluation results (shown in the third column of Table 6 ) correspond to the first point (with ratio = 1) in each figure. In our future work, we will study the use of Newton iterative method to find out the optimal ratio so that we can achieve optimal utility preservation in our divide and conquer approach.
Evaluation on other real graphs and synthetic graphs
In this section, we conduct evaluations to compare the utility of the direct approach and the D&C D approach on the other four real graphs and various synthetic graphs generated by the three graph models (ER, WS, and BA). In all our experiments, we fix d = 0.01 and set 0 here with the magnitude of n Á ; where 2 f0:01; 0:1; 1; 10g: As a result, each entry of the vector achieves the same ð; dÞ-differential privacy as the previous experiment. For the D&C D approach, we simply distribute privacy budget equally, i.e., setting the distribution ratio of privacy budget as 1. As illustrated in Sect. 5.2, we would achieve even better utility preservation for the D&C approach when we adopt a better strategy of distributing privacy budget.
The evaluation results are shown in Table 7 . Specifically, we have the following observations. -For the ER model with parameters n and p, ER1, ER2, and ER3 are generated with the same number of nodes n = 1,000 with increasing p values, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5. The number of edges (m), the average cluster coefficient (" c), and the fraction of triangle (fr D ) of these three graphs increase with the increasing of p. For the direct approach, we can see that the entrywise absolute error increases with p. On the contrary, the entrywise absolute error decreases for the D&C D approach. Thus, we can conclude that the D&C D approach tends to achieve much better utility preservation than the direct approach for ER random graphs. The utility of D&C D approach increases as p increases. -For the WS model with parameters n, k and p, from Sect. 2.3, we know that the graph tends to have more triangles and larger distance when p is near 0 and the graph is more random with less triangles and shorter distance when p approaches 1. WS1, WS2, and WS3 are generated with the same parameters n and k but decreasing p as 0.7, 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. These three graphs have the same density but increasing " c and fr D . We see no clear trend of the absolute entrywise error change for both approaches. WS3, WS4, and WS5 are generated with the same parameters n and p (0.2) but increasing k as 50, 100, and 500, respectively. As a result, these three graphs have increasing m; " c; and fr D . For the direct approach, we can see that the entrywise absolute error increases with k whereas the entrywise absolute error decreases for the D&C D approach. Thus, we can conclude that the D&C D approach tends to achieve much better utility preservation than the direct approach among WS small-world graphs and the utility of the D&C D approach increases as k increases.
-For the BA model with parameters n, m 0 , and m 1 , BA1, BA2, and BA3 are generated with the same parameter n and increasing m 1 as 25, 50, and 250, respectively. Recall that in the BA model m 1 denotes the number of newly added edges between each new node and existing nodes. Note that when the ratio between m 0 and m 1 is fixed, the increase of m 1 indicates the increases of m; " c; and fr D . For the direct approach, we can see that the entrywise absolute error increases with the increase of m 1 , whereas the entrywise absolute error decreases for the D&C D approach. Thus, we can conclude that the D&C D approach tends to achieve much better utility preservation than the direct approach among BA small-world graphs with large density.
-For the BA model with parameters n, m 0 and m 1 , BA4, BA5, BA6, and BA7 are generated with the same parameters n and m 1 = 5 but increasing m 0 as 10, 50, 100, and 500, respectively. Recall that in the BA model m 0 denotes the number of nodes in the starting set. When m 1 is fixed, the increase of m 0 indicates the increases of " c and fr D : We can see that the utility of the D&C D approach is still better than that of the direct approach but not as significant as the graphs BA1, BA2, and BA3. The absolute entrywise error for the D&C D approach increases as parameter m 0 increases, which shows the same trend as that of the direct approach. Thus, we can conclude that the D&C D approach still tends to achieve better utility preservation than the direct approach among BA small-world graphs with low density but its advantage decreases when m 0 is larger. -For all four real networks (Enron, Polbook, Polblog and YesIWell), we can see that the D&C D approach outperforms the direct approach. The extent of the advantage of the D&C D approach is similar to that observed in BA graphs with low density (BA4, BA5, BA6, and BA7).
In summary, we draw the following conclusions. First, the D&C D approach outperforms the direct approach in all graphs (15 synthetic graphs and 4 real graphs). Second, the D&C D approach shows overwhelming superiority in all three graphs generated by the ER model, all five graphs generated by the WS model, and the first three graphs (BA1, BA2, BA3) from the BA model. In the above 11 graphs, the entrywise error of the output of D&C D approach tends to be much smaller (by several orders of magnitude) than that of the direct approach. Third, for real graphs (Enron, Polbook, Polblog, and YesIWell) and the last four graphs (BA4, BA5, BA6 and BA7) generated with the BA model, the advantage of the D&C D approach is still obvious and the entrywise error of the output of D&C D approach is still smaller (by 10 % with small or by one order of magnitude with large than that of the direct approach. We observe that the four real networks and the last four BA graphs are relatively sparse and most nodes tend to have a very small magnitude of degree (less than 10) and hence a small number of triangles. When calibrating the noises to N D and D in our D&C D approach, the influence due to the distortion is large. As a result, the advantage of our D&C D approach decreases when the graphs have low density.
Conclusion and future work
Enabling accurate analysis of graph data while preserving differential privacy is of great importance and poses great challenge due to potential high global sensitivity. In this paper, we have presented a divide and conquer approach that can be used to enforce differential privacy for complex functions. We have conducted theoretical analyses and extensive empirical evaluations to show that the developed divide and conquer approach generally outperforms the approach of directly enforcing differential privacy in terms of utility preservation. This result is especially promising for data mining or exploration tasks with interactive processes, in which a user can adaptively query the system about the data. The user now has options of reusing previous intermediate query results rather than submitting to the system ''new'' queries that can be expressed by previous ones. There are some other aspects of this work that merit further research. Among them, we will continue the line of this research by investigating how to enforce differential privacy for other complex functions or social network analysis tasks. For functions that we cannot compute the smooth sensitivity efficiently or explicitly, Nissim et al. (2007) proposed an approximation method that computes the b-smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity of these functions and developed a sample-aggregation framework for a large class of functions. We will evaluate those functions based on the sample-aggregation framework. We will exploit the use of correlations among unit computations to further reduce noise and enhance accuracies of computation outputs. Our goal was to identify (optimal) decomposition strategies and (optimal) budget privacy distribution. Finally, we will study non-interactive graph data release mechanisms, i.e., we use the derived differentially private graph statistics to generate synthetic graphs for release.
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A Proof
Proof of Lemma 1 because we have to add two edges to form a triangle to make the sensitivity increased by one, after completing all the b ij half-built triangles involving edge (i, j). Besides, LS C (s) (G) B GS C (G) = n -1. So we have Eq. (17).
Proof of Result 4. In addition to the Proof of Result 2 given in Nissim et al. (2007) , LS ðsÞ N D ðGÞ ¼ 3 Á max i6 ¼j; j2½n c ij ðsÞ because each of the two entries corresponding to vertex i and j will be decreased by at most max i6 ¼j; j2½n c ij ðsÞ; when edge (i, j) is deleted from G. Besides, there are max i6 ¼j; j2½n c ij ðsÞ other entries whose values will be decreased by one, corresponding to the neighbors in common by vertex i and j.
For N 3 , we first consider the situation of s = 0, 
LS N

